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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Competition law aims at safeguarding the competitive process in the market by preventing anti-
competitive agreements and the abuse of market dominance, as well as by controlling mergers1, 
while intellectual property (IP) law provides exclusive rights to inventors and authors, thereby 
ensuring incentives for innovation, which include the discovery, development, and 
commercialisation of new products. 2  Often, this exclusivity is considered to be innately 
monopolistic. 3  In recent times, however, the view has increasingly gained ground that 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) do not necessarily confer market power, let alone a dominant 
position or a monopoly. 4  The Chicago School scholars were the first to argue that the 
presumption of an inherent tension between IP law and competition law is a mistake because 
of the confusion of property rights with monopoly. 5  Today, the view is widespread that 
competition policy and IP protection stand in a complementary relationship, rather than in strict 
opposition.6 This more reconcilliatory approach underlines the common goals of both fields of 
law without denying the tension in specific cases. 
   It is only from a short run perspective that there is a contradiction between the exclusion of 
(static) competition by IPRs and the goal of competition law to secure and intensify 
competition. As soon as a dynamic stance is taken, the similarities between the two fields of 
law become clearer: Not only IP law, but also competition law, strive to foster innovation and 
technological progress.7 Only the methods to achieve this goal are different: IP law excludes 
competition by imitation in order to promote competition by substitution. Competition law, by 
contrast, strengthens the competitive process because experience shows that innovation is 
yielded most frequently in an economic environment of optimal competitive intensity.8 As 
                                                 
1 In the United States, the term antitrust law is used to indicate the body of law prohibiting anti-competitive 
practices. Outside of the United States, competition law is more commonly used in many jurisdictions. In this 
article, we will continue to use competition law, except when referring to US law. 
2 Carrier 2009, p. 19. 
3 Cf. Hovenkamp 2011, p. 260. 
4 For the EU, see European Court of Justice, Joint Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission 
(‘Magill’), ECR 1995, I-743, para. 46: "So far as a dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the 
outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a position." For US law, see the 
US Supreme Court, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006), reversing the presumption resulting 
from older case-law that a patent confers market power. See also the US Licensing Guidelines, at 2.2. 
5 See the ground-breaking study of Bowman 1973; for a more recent analysis, see Landes and Posner 2003, p. 
374. However, there are some criticisms of this property view. See e.g., Gilbert 2008, p. 524 et seq. 
6 For an overview on the changing concepts in the relationship between IP and competition law, see Abbott 2014. 
7 Dynamic efficiency usually means the gains from innovation and the emergence of new technologies. See Crane 
2015, p. 10. 
8 Lowe and Peeperkorn 2005, p. 266. For the optimal intensity of competition, see Aghion et al. 2005. 
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regards the relationship between static and dynamic efficiency, it seems preferable to give 
precedence to the latter form.9 
   Many competition regimes admit the importance of rules at the intersection of competition 
law and IP, but it is not an easy task to provide an appropriate framework or guidance in the 
balancing test.10 They often declare that IP law and competition law share the ultimate goal of 
improving welfare, which underlines the symbiotic relationship between these branches. 
Nevertheless, tensions between them remain, and competition authorities and courts have faced 
difficult cases covering all subfields of competition law, i.e. restrictive agreements, the abuse 
of dominance and merger control. Therefore, the task of achieving an appropriate balance 
between fostering incentives and maintaining the competitive process in IP-related contexts is 
crucial.11 For this reason, competition policymakers in different jurisdictions have started 
designing legal frameworks by providing various hard and soft laws to offer guidance. 
This article aims to examine the existing approaches to the intersection of competition law and 
IP from a comparative perspective, choosing the example of licensing agreements and taking 
into account US, EU and Korean law. The article continues with three sections. Section 2 
discusses the general features of licensing guidelines in the three jurisdictions mentioned. 
Section 3 then demonstrates the process of legal transplantation and convergence focusing on 
the market share threshold method. This section also discusses related problems, including 
market definition and the relationship to market dominance scrutiny. Section 4 finally 
summarises and concludes this article. 
 
2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GUIDELINES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1 The United States: From the Nine No-No’s to the Licensing Guidelines 
 
The expansion of the scope of antitrust law through US case law, which is based on diverse 
economic theories,12 has influenced the US’s overall approach to IP and other competition 
regimes.13 In particular, patent misuse, which is one of the key examples, is blended with 
competition law theories, as the US courts have held that many business practices that represent 
                                                 
9 Sidak and Teece 2011, p. 93. 
10 Myers 2007, p. 3. 
11 See e.g., Goyder and Albors-Llorens 2009, p. 261. 
12 Leslie 2011, p. 44. The author argues that the evolution of economic theories on how to balance the concerns 
of competition law and IP law has helped courts to begin issuing more nuanced opinions on this issue. 
13 Leslie 2011, p. 41. 
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patent misuse also may infringe antitrust law.14 However, at least since the adoption of the 
Licensing Guidelines and the Illinois Tool Works decision,15 the US regime has started with the 
idea that the mere existence of an IP right does not necessarily mean a monopoly, although 
some IPRs may create market power, particularly when there are no strong substitutable 
technologies for the IP. Therefore, antitrust law and IP law are considered to be complementary. 
Both laws enhance market competition by encouraging competitors to enter the market 
rigorously, 16  which is related to its contestability. 17  Hence, the inclusion of potential 
competitors in the market is also important.18 
   The US adopted antitrust law as early as 189019 and was the first country to give detailed 
antitrust guidance on IP rights, the so-called ‘Nine No-No’s’ in the 1970s,20 which summarised 
the government agencies’ views at that time about potential violations of antitrust law. The now 
withdrawn Nine No-No’s provided a list of prohibitions on patent licensing, such as package 
licensing, tying, compulsory grantback, vertical restraints, etc.21 The prohibitions of the Nine 
No-No’s were criticised by numerous commentators because of their inflexibility.22 Critics 
condemned the Nine No-No’s on the basis that they were inconsistent with US case law and 
were not economically sound.23 Furthermore, the black list of the Nine No-No’s could generate 
a typical strait-jacket effect, which was inconsistent with the case-law tradition.24 
   The Nine No-No’s were revoked in 1981. In 1995, the US antitrust authorities adopted the 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (hereinafter “US Licensing 
Guidelines” or simply “Guidelines”).25 The US Licensing Guidelines are considered to be more 
                                                 
14 Leslie 2011, p. 42. 
15 See supra note 4. 
16 See e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2007, p. 2. The degree of competition and 
innovation is deeply related to market entry, which involves alternatives. See also Geroski 1999, p. 19. 
17 Heinemann 2008, p. 78 et seq. Heinemann argues that the contestable market theory can justify IP protection 
and the limits by competition law enforcement, which balances the pros and cons of each law. 
18 Teece 2011, p. 221. 
19 Sometimes, US antitrust law is given credit as the first competition law of the modern world. In fact, Canada 
adopted a competition law in 1889 (i.e. one year earlier than the Sherman Act in the US), although this law never 
achieved a status comparable to the Sherman Act, see Gerber 2010, p. 259. 
20 Wilson 1970; Carrier 2009, p. 77. 
21 See e.g., ABA 2007, p. 77; Gavil et al. 2008, p. 1195. The Nine No-No’s covered: (i) tying of unpatented to 
patented products, (ii) mandatory grantbacks, (iii) post-sale resale restrictions, (iv) tie-outs (restricting a licensee's 
ability to deal in products outside the scope of the patent), (v) exclusive licensing, (vi) mandatory package 
licensing, (vii) compulsory payment of royalties not reasonably related to sales of the patented product, (viii) 
restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a patented process, and (ix) utilising vertical price-fixing 
involving the licensing of patented products.  
22 Myers 2007, p. 79. 
23 Carrier 2009, p. 77; Leslie 2011, pp. 42-43; Sprigman 2012, p. 351. 
24 Choi 2011, p. 122 
25 US Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. 
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balanced than other previously designed US policies. The Guidelines are not legally binding, 
but only reflect the US agencies’ approach to IP issues. However, the Guidelines are highly 
significant, because they provide a clear explanation of the relationship between antitrust and 
IP. The Guidelines have been regarded as the starting point for discussions on this hybrid area 
of law.26 Furthermore, they have exerted a tremendous influence on competition policy in other 
jurisdictions, thus transplanting US legal techniques into other regimes. 
   Section 2 of the US Guidelines embodies three general principles for articulating the 
relationship between antitrust and IP as follows: (i) the enforcement agencies regard IP as being 
essentially comparable to other types of property; (ii) the agencies do not presume that IP 
creates market power; and (iii) the agencies recognise that IP licensing allows undertakings to 
combine complementary factors of production and is generally pro-competitive. Based on this 
outline, it provides a safety zone under Section 4.3, thereby ensuring some degree of certainty 
and encouraging the transfer of technology.27 It declares that the antitrust authorities would not 
prohibit a restraint in an IP licensing agreement where (i) the restraint is not facially anti-
competitive, such as, e.g., a per se violation,28 and (ii) the total market share of the licensor and 
its licensees is not more than 20 per cent in each relevant market. 
   If market share data are not available or do not sufficiently mirror the competitive situation, 
the safety zone criteria for non-product markets are as follows. First, in a technology market,29 
the US enforcement agencies do not challenge a restraint in an IP licensing agreement if (i) the 
restraint is not prima facie anti-competitive and (ii) there are four or more independently 
controlled technologies that can substitute for the licensed technology (“4-plus-test”). Second, 
in an innovation market,30 the federal agencies also do not challenge a restraint in an IP 
agreement that is not facially anti-competitive and (ii) at least four independently controlled 
entities hold the essential and specialised assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage 
                                                 
26 Leslie 2011, p. 45. 
27 However, some argue that the self-assessment framework in the context of a safe harbour generates problems 
of legal uncertainty, because neither market definition nor the evaluation of efficiencies is an exact science. See 
Kuik 2007, p. 170. 
28 This type of restraint includes hard-core restrictions, such as price fixing and output restriction. 
29 Sec. 3.2.2 of the US Guidelines explains that “[t]echnology markets consist of the intellectual property that is 
licensed … and its close substitutes—that is, the technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes 
significantly to constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that is licensed.” 
30 Sec. 3.2.3 of the US Guidelines clarifies that “[a]n innovation market consists of the research and development 
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and 
development.” 
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in R&D which can be a close substitute for the R&D activities. This innovation market can be 
understood as competitive.31 
   In addition, the Guidelines articulate that, although some horizontal agreements can receive 
the benefit of the safety zone, hard-core practices, such as price-fixing, output restrictions, 
market allocations, and group boycotts, which are treated as per se illegal, cannot fall within 
the safety zone.32 In summary, the US formulation of safety zone criteria follows a three-prong 
test: (i) 20 per cent market share threshold, (ii) four or more alternative technologies or 
entities,33 and (iii) a scrutiny of per se illegal restraints.34 Market share thresholds are at the 
heart of the analysis, with no tolerance for hard-core practices. 
 
2.2 The European Union: The Development of Block Exemption Regulations 
 
Similar, but not identical to the US regime, the importance of IP is often highlighted in the 
commercial areas in the EU facing complex issues, including market integration.35 Accordingly, 
the EU Commission (hereinafter the Commission) adopted its first Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation (TTBER) in 1996, 36  which repealed the old block exemption 
regulations for patent and know-how licences.37 The 1996 TTBER was replaced by Regulation 
772/2004,38 which is regarded as a new stage of TTBER development as a result of its flexible 
and economic approach,39 and finally, Regulation 316/2014 has taken over and has repealed 
                                                 
31 Glader 2006, p. 225. 
32 Sec. 5.1 of the US Guidelines. 
33 For the ‘4-plus-test’, see Heinemann 2011b, p. 203. 
34 See e.g., ABA 2007, p. 491. 
35 IP rights traditionally have been granted at the Member State level, creating tensions between free trade and the 
competition rules of the EU. Not only the existence of national IP laws in each Member State, but also their 
differences, raise concerns, because the diversity of laws can be detrimental to the objective of an EU internal 
market. See e.g., Coates et al. 2014, p. 1145; Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 847; Rose and Bailey 2013, pp. 674-675; 
Whish and Bailey 2012, p. 768. For further discussion about the problem of the internal market and IP in the EU, 
see Caggiano 2012, p. 3 et seq.; Cornish et al. 2010, p. 818 et seq.; Heinemann 2011a, p. 303 et seq. See also the 
fundamental Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299. 
36 Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
[now Article 101(3) TFEU] to certain categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 31/2. 
37 Commission Regulations (EEC) No 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 and 556/89 of 30 November 1989. In particular, 
the emergence of complex cases of patent licences in the 1970s seemed to bring about the thought of adopting 
regulations for technology transfer agreements. See e.g., Greaves 1994, p. 9; Korah 1996, pp. 2-3; Ritter and 
Braun 2004, pp. 791-792. 
38 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L123/11. 
39 Anderman 2008, p. 110. The legal framework of the TTBER demonstrates newly developed features: (i) a more 
economic goal to EU competition policy, (ii) the use of economic analysis, (iii) the offer of safe harbour based 
legal certainty, and (iv) the procedural change in enforcement. See also Anderman and Schmidt 2011, pp. 203-
204. 
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the older text.40 There were major developments in the TTBERs, which were the abandonment 
of white lists and the considerable shortening of black lists.41 This development was apparently 
inspired by the repeal of the Nine No-No’s in the US and the adoption of market share 
thresholds subject to exceptions for hard-core restrictions. 
   The development of the different block exemption regulations is characterised by the 
transition from a rather ‘formalist and rigid’ approach creating strait-jacket problems to a 
generally positive view of licensing, because it facilitates the distribution of knowledge and 
skills and maximises the beneficial outcomes of innovation through licensing and technology 
exchange.42 The automatic exemption of certain technology transfer agreements thus reduces 
the private and public administrative costs and burdens of a case-by-case scrutiny under Article 
101(1) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).43 In addition 
to the 2014 TTBER, the Commission also provides TT-Guidelines 44  which clarify the 
implementation of the law in detail. 
   The TTBER has a two-stage-exemption safe harbour. Article 3 TTBER states that, where the 
combined market share of competing undertakings does not exceed 20 per cent or where that 
of non-competing undertakings is less than 30 per cent, the agreeing parties can receive 
exemption benefits. However, the benefit of the block exemption regulation disappears if 
undertakings include a hard-core restriction, even if their market share satisfies the conditions 
in Article 3. The lists of hard-core restrictions are different for competitors and for firms 
standing in a vertical relationship: For the former, the list includes price-fixing, output 
restrictions, market allocations, and restrictions on the licensee’s ability to exploit its 
technology rights or on carrying out R&D. In vertical relationships, the black list contains 
resale price maintenance (with an exception for maximum sale prices and non-binding price 
recommendations), the exclusion of certain passive sales, and certain restrictions of sales to 
end-users in selective distribution systems.45 
                                                 
40 Commission Regulations (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L93/17. For further 
detail about TTBER development, see also Goyder and Albors-Llorens 2009, pp. 263-281; Anderman 2006, pp. 
76-89. 
41 For further details, see Korah 1996, p. 158 et seq. 
42 See Drexl 2008, p. 29; Fine 2006, p. 50; Lowe and Peeperkorn 2005, p. 278; Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 867. 
43 Armillotta 2010, pp. 96-97. 
44 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
technology transfer agreements, OJ 2014, C 89/3. 
45 Art. 4 TTBER. 
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   Unlike the US Guidelines, the EU’s TTBER is legally binding, thereby ensuring effective 
competition and providing a sufficient level of legal certainty for undertakings,46 although the 
Commission may withdraw the benefits of the exemption in certain individual cases or declare 
the regulation inapplicable in certain economic sectors where parallel licensing agreements 
cover more than 50 per cent of a relevant market.47 Overall, this scheme is based on the 
simplification of the legal framework and on the adoption of an effects-based, rather than a 
form-based approach.48 Its inspiration by the US Licensing Guidelines is palpable: Market-
share based criteria, in conjunction with the exclusion of hard-core restrictions, is supposed to 
give simple and clear guidance to practitioners and undertakings, thereby reducing legal 
uncertainty in the competition law evaluation of IP practices. 
 
2.3 The Republic of Korea: The One-Size-Fits-All Guidelines 
 
The Korean competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (the KFTC), adopted its 
guidelines on IP, the Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter the Korean IP Guidelines), which have been revised four times since 2000.49 The 
Korean IP Guidelines, which are pursuant to the purposes of the Korean competition law, the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA),50 stipulate that it aims to improve the 
consistency and predictability of the law’s enforcement and to enhance fair trade practices 
through the criteria for the exercise of the IP rights provided by the Guidelines.51 In particular, 
the Guidelines declare its applicability to foreign undertakings, confirming extraterritorial 
application. 
   Similar to the approaches in the US and the EU, Article II.1 of the Guidelines states that the 
MRFTA and the system of IP rights ultimately pursue a common objective, because a distorted 
market structure may inhibit the development of innovative technology. Article II.2 further 
clarifies that an exercise of IP rights under Article 59 MRFTA (which provides exemptions for 
lawful exercises) is compatible with competition law, as long as it stays within the scope of the 
                                                 
46 See also Choi 2011, p. 133. 
47 Arts. 6 and 7 TTBER. 
48 Armillotta 2010, p. 103. 
49  Amended on 17 December 2014, KFTC, established rule no. 205, available in English at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401. Accessed 12 March 2015. For further 
detail, see also Choi 2011, pp. 124-127. 
50 Law no. 13071, amended on 20 January 2015. 
51 For general information, see also Cheng 2012, p. 504 et seq; Choi 2011, p. 125. 
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IPR and does not go against the original purpose of the right in question. At the same time, the 
Guidelines provide certain criteria for the scrutiny of whether an exercise of IP rights runs afoul 
of the prohibition of the abuse of market dominance and of restrictive agreements. Therefore, 
the Guidelines cover both unilateral and coordinated practices which are somewhat different 
from those of other competition regimes. 
   In particular, the Korean IP Guidelines provide the criteria for the relevant market definition 
by stating that other KFTC guidelines on the abuse of market dominance and merger control 
can also be applicable mutatis mutandis. In addition, similar to those of other regimes, they 
state that technology markets and innovation markets have to be distinguished. The Guidelines 
also prescribe specific criteria for the scrutiny of a number of practices, including the 
acquisition of patent rights, grantbacks, the exercise of patent rights by filing suits, grant of 
licence, refusal to license, patent pools, technology standards, the exercise of patent rights by 
non-practicing entities, and so on.52 
   The whole format of the Korean IP Guidelines appears similar to those of the US and the EU 
or a mixture of them. The Korean Guidelines proscribe certain business practices regarding the 
exercise of IP rights. The Guidelines are not legally binding and simply offer informal guidance 
to undertakings by providing examples and criteria,53 which are different from the Nine No-
No’s in the US and the pre-1996 regulations in the EU. Despite the lack of binding effect, the 
Guidelines are important as screening devices for allocating the enforcement agency’s 
resources and for informing a category of acts that possibly violate the law.54 In addition to the 
Guidelines, the Korean competition regime provides a ‘comfort letter’ type authorisation 
method for agreements, which can reduce possible over-enforcement. 
   Unlike the safe harbour provisions in the guidelines of the US and the EU, the Korean IP 
Guidelines do not provide market share thresholds. One of the main reasons is that the MRFTA 
already provides a market dominance presumption standard which is based on market shares.55 
In addition, the KFTC’s other guidelines, including those on unfair business practices and 
agreements, contain the safety zone criteria of market share thresholds, which are 10 and 20 
                                                 
52 See also Choi 2011, p. 126. 
53 The Supreme Court of Korea held that the market share threshold in the Guidelines is not legally binding, and 
the Commission can withdraw the relevant provision in individual cases, e.g., Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment 
2009Du9543, 25 November 2010. 
54 See e.g., Ginsburg and Fraser 2011, p. 49. 
55 Art. 4 MRFTA: Market share of a single undertaking is 50% or more; alternatively, the combined market share 
of three or fewer undertakings is 75% or more (with an exception for firms with a market share below 10%). 
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per cent respectively.56 Therefore, it is possible that undertakings may rely on the criteria of 
market-share-based standards, although the Korean IP Guidelines do not include a market-
share-threshold exemption. 
 
3. THE STANDARD OF DESIGNING GUIDELINES: TRANSPLANTATION OF LEGAL TECHNIQUES 
 
3.1 The Necessity of Rules for the Grey Area 
 
Competition law and IP law face certain conflicts in implementation and often work as a spear 
and a shield in courtrooms because of the intrinsic tensions between them, at least in the short 
run.57 Therefore, as discussed above, the issue of the intersection between competition law and 
IP is one of the most difficult and heavily debated areas of the law.58 In particular, the debate 
about the ex ante and ex post approaches is at the heart of competition policy in the field of IP. 
In theory, holding a monopoly position, possibly for a short term, can provide investment 
incentives for inventions, thereby generating worthier long-run social gains.59 Therefore, the 
ex ante approach, which is based on incentives, contrasts with the ex post approach by placing 
less emphasis on market power and is crucial for the competition law scrutiny of IP cases.60 
   Considering both the ex ante and ex post approaches, it is important for policymakers to 
decide whether IP and competition law intrinsically conflict with each other or simply have 
different methods to achieve the same objective.61 But also, if the latter view is taken (which 
we here advise), it is important to provide clearer guidance for the exercise of IP rights, 
especially through the adoption of IP guidelines as shown previously.62 
   In this context, the concept of market power seems particularly important. The issue of 
market-share based guidance involving IPRs had been discussed by quite a number of 
                                                 
56 Art. V.1.Ga.(4) of the Guidelines for the Review of Unfair Trade Practices, amended on 12 August 2012, 
established rule no. 72 of the KFTC; Art. V.2.Ga.(2) of the Guidelines for the Concerted Practice Review, amended 
20 August 2012, established rule no. 165 of the KFTC, English version is available at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401. Accessed 16 March 2015. 
57 In particular, IP law ensures higher prices for recoupment by avoiding competition by imitation; on the contrary, 
competition law aims to promote lower prices by preventing anti-competitive business practices. See Gilbert and 
Weinschel 2008, p. 2009. 
58 Myers 2007, p. 3. 
59 Cotter 2015, p. 132. 
60 See e.g., Sullivan and Grimes 2006, p. 843. 
61 Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 851. Some argue that the conflict between the two laws is exaggerated because of the 
problem of uncertainty involving the optimal amount and scope of IP protection. Hovenkamp 2005, p. 225. 
62 In particular, the development of the EU’s block exemption regulations is one of the important features of the 
modernisation of competition rules, which is based on the more economic approach. See e.g., Mendelsohn and 
Rose 2002, pp. 39-41. 
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commentators even before the emergence of IP guidelines. For example, Jorde and Teece 
suggested early that competition law needs to recognise a safe harbour which is based on 
market power assessments, especially for horizontal agreements among undertakings with less 
than 20 per cent market share. They further argued that a market power threshold indicates the 
legal treatment of certain agreements by ensuring an objective test, providing a self-assessment 
of the legality of undertakings’ plans.63 
   In fact, the market share thresholds which numerous competition regimes have adopted also 
appear appropriate in the IP context, although there are some ongoing debates about which type 
of market structure is the most conducive to innovation.64 The number of cases involving the 
interface of IP and competition law is increasing worldwide, including in the developing 
world.65 A convergence in the regulatory frameworks of IP guidelines will help multinational 
enterprises to avoid possible violations of competition law in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
the concept of market power itself is often regarded as a difficult one, and a conventional price 
test for assessing market power often fails, especially in the IP world.66 Therefore, it is crucial 
to give direction for the definition of markets and the assessment of market power in IP-related 
contexts. 
 
3.2 Market Definition and Market Power in the New Economy 
 
Because most competition regimes rely on market share thresholds to assess potential anti-
competitive harm, market definition is essential.67 However, as Kaplow asserts, it is often 
difficult to rationalise market definition in a coherent and useful way.68 Indeed, a substitution 
analysis for the purpose of market definition is becoming more difficult in the ICT sector 
because empirical data for cross-elasticity is unreliable or even unavailable, thus making it 
difficult to apply the SSNIP test (small but significant and non-transitory increase in price). 
Moreover, this test is rather useful for a static market analysis, focusing on short-term price 
                                                 
63 Jorde and Teece 1992, p. 56. However, Sidak and Teece argue that the market share criterion itself is not a clear 
proxy for an overall appraisal. See also Sidak and Teece 2011, pp. 61-64. 
64 Niels et al. 2011, p. 172. 
65 Most cases concern the abuse of market dominance, such as Microsoft, Intel, and Qualcomm, but cases on 
restrictive agreements, such as, e.g., reverse payments, also appear in numerous jurisdictions, e.g., Supreme Court 
of Korea, Judgment 2012Du24498, 27 February 2014. 
66 See e.g., Cass and Hylton 2013, p. 187. 
67 Nevo 2015, p. 10. 
68 Kaplow 2015, p. 345. Multi-sided platforms are one of the best examples of this problem, because it is often 
difficult to measure substitutability with respect to the different market sides. See e.g., Evans and Schmalensee 
2015, p. 422. 
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competition, rather than in a dynamic context.69 In addition, unlike other types of product 
markets, it is often difficult for lawyers and economists to decide whether and to what extent 
substitution between products made by different technologies is plausible.70 There are some 
explanations for this difficulty. Unlike mature industries focusing on prices, the aspect of 
innovation is decisive for the high-technology sector. Accordingly, the concept of SSNIP is of 
limited relevance in dynamic industries.71 
   Therefore, in sectors characterised by rapid technological changes, more general reflections 
have to be made, taking into account improvements in quality and advantages in cost saving.72 
One of the important features in high-technology or new economy73 industries is that the 
borderline between products and services is often unclear.74 Nevertheless, measuring market 
power on the basis of market definition is still the most effective technical framework, as it 
establishes the economic context, gives an idea of market structure and performance, and 
provides a first impression of market dynamics.75 Problems of market definition encountered 
in IP industries may be alleviated by IP guidelines which, at the same time, may consider other 
aspects like R&D, the level of complexity, customers’ bargaining power, and market entry.76 
In this sense, competition regimes around the world have tried to establish guidance for 
undertakings and lawyers, and we can observe a significant level of convergence regarding this 
issue. 
   This is especially true for the situation in the EU and the US, as both jurisdictions have moved 
to an economic approach to scrutinise IP arrangements.77 For example, similar to the US 
Guidelines, the EU’s TT-Guidelines articulate the methodology for market definition. 
Paragraph 21 of the TT-Guidelines states that the relevant product market consists of the 
contract products and those which are interchangeable or substitutable for the products, 
considering their characteristics, prices, and intended use. Paragraph 22 of the Guidelines, then, 
                                                 
69 Nevo 2015, p. 87. 
70 Pleatsikas and Teece 2001, p. 108. 
71 Pleatsikas and Teece 2001, p. 111. However, it may be useful to transform the SSNIP into a SSNDQ (small but 
significant non-transitory decrease in quality) test for the purpose of the “free” Internet markets: This new test 
allows a determination of substitutability when prices are not available or non-existent, but variations in quality 
will be important for demand, see Gebicka and Heinemann 2014, p. 156 et seq. 
72 Gavil et al. 2008, p. 1173. 
73  The new economy refers to the newly developed industries, including computer software, Internet-based 
business, and communication services. The new-economy industries can be characterised by falling average costs 
over outputs, high rates of innovation, easy entry and exit, and considerable economies of scale and scope. See 
Posner 2001, p. 925; Landes and Posner 2003, p. 390. 
74 Gavil et al. 2008, pp. 1155-1156. 
75 See e.g., Gotts 2013, p. 162. 
76 Gotts 2013, p. 180. 
77 Anderman 2012, p. 466; Lowe and Peeperkorn 2005, p. 281. 
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clarifies the relevant technology markets as follows. The technology markets comprise the 
licensed technology rights and other technologies which are considered by the licensees as 
interchangeable or substitutable, again based on their characteristics, royalties, and intended 
use. The SSNIP test may be useful in this context, i.e. the response of licensees to a small but 
permanent increase in relative prices, i.e. the royalties.78 As stated above, this set of provisions 
can also be found in Korea, which indicates a large degree of convergence. 
   There is no doubt that the US Guidelines have influenced IP guidance in other competition 
regimes, especially regarding the complexity of market definition and the distinction between 
technology and innovation markets.79 This standard of analysis, despite the existing problem 
of vague criteria in technology markets, has spread out around the world and has influenced 
the design of IP guidelines universally. The methodology of market definition and market share 
thresholds, with exceptions for hard-core restrictions, demonstrates an important convergence 
in competition law techniques. 
   Moreover, it is not an easy task to determine the market share of the parties to an IP licensing 
arrangement, because it is difficult to define the relevant market in the new economy.80 In 
particular, innovative goods can leap forward and change to another market easily, thereby 
replacing old ones. Therefore, we can often observe sudden and unpredictable high market 
shares in technology and innovation markets. Some argue that a quick look assessment based 
on market share falls short, because IP-related markets have a dynamic nature. Therefore, a 
high market share may be a poor indicator in the arena of rapid change and may insufficiently 
suggest market power in some cases.81 Over-enforcement may be the consequence: If IP 
holders cannot satisfy the conditions of the block exemption, they may be hesitant to license 
out their technology. A disincentive to license would be the consequence.82 
 
3.3 Flexibilities and Solutions 
 
These concerns deserve further analysis. Before looking deeper into the problem of market 
definition and the weight of market shares in the IP context, a more general discussion seems 
necessary. As already mentioned, the old world of the Nine No-No’s in the US and the white 
                                                 
78 See also Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 881. 
79 See e.g., Heinemann 2012, p. 57. 
80 Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 867. 
81 Teece 2011, p. 222. 
82 Anderman 2008, pp. 117-118. 
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lists in the early block exemption regulations in the EU was criticised because of the lack of 
economic underpinning and the straight-jacket effect. A more positive appreciation of 
restrictive clauses in licensing agreements was called for. At the same time, market share 
thresholds were rejected, because – in the view of the critics – it is difficult for firms to 
determine their market share. However, this position does not seem consistent. If a more 
economic perspective is taken, going beyond the type of the licensing clause and taking into 
account the whole economic context, the position of firms in the market is a decisive factor. 
For example, in the assessment of an exclusive licence, it is important to know if the parties 
are competitors or if they stand in a vertical relationship to each other. In both cases, the 
strength of the parties in the affected markets is likewise important. 
   As market shares are the most helpful proxy in gaining a first impression of market power, it 
seems indispensable to accompany the more lenient treatment of restrictive licensing clauses 
with the caveat of market share thresholds. To be clear in this regard: Market share thresholds 
should not determine the outcome of the analysis. They should rather work as a safe harbour: 
Below the threshold, firms can be sure that their licensing agreement is compatible with 
competition law (as long as hardcore restrictions are avoided). Above the threshold, a more 
careful analysis is necessary. The result of the deeper evaluation may still be in favour of the 
agreement as it stands. However, a closer look is required to get to this result. To summarise, 
it is not possible to call for a more economic view, and at the same time, to reject instruments 
of analysis whose aim is precisely to draw closer to the economic reality of markets. 
   This leads to the difficulties inherent in market share criteria. It is certainly one of the most 
demanding exercises of competition law to define relevant markets. However, on the one hand, 
market definition does not start from scratch. As it is at the heart of competition law, a plethora 
of case law, nationally and internationally, is available in order to help with this task. As has 
been pointed out, guidelines apply the framework to IP-related contexts. On the other hand, 
additional instruments have been introduced which short-circuit the need for market definition. 
The 4-plus-test (recognised by the US and the EU Licensing Guidelines83) takes a view that is 
more technological than economic: If there are at least four substitutable technologies in the 
hands of other companies, a competition law violation is unlikely to occur (outside of the world 
of hardcore restrictions). As a result, market definition is not necessary in practice if the 
existence of at least four technological substitutes can be shown. 
                                                 
83 See supra at note 33. 
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   But even if a closer assessment of markets is necessary, legal rules and guidance should help 
as much as possible. The European TTBER, for example, contains special rules for the 
calculation of market shares. According to Art. 8 lit. a TTBER, the market share shall be 
calculated on the basis of market sales value data. If this is not available, estimates are allowed, 
for example, on the basis of sales volumes. As regards technology markets, Art. 8 lit. d TTBER 
makes clear that market shares in technology markets shall be calculated on the basis of the 
presence of the licensed technology in product markets. As it is difficult to determine the market 
shares for the current period, Art. 8 lit. b TTBER declares the preceding calendar year to be 
relevant. The European block exemption regulation also gives an answer to the phenomenon 
of volatile market shares in dynamic markets: Pursuant to Art. 8 lit. e TTBER, the exemption 
applies for two additional years after the market share thresholds have been exceeded.84 
   These flexibilities remove uncertainties to a great extent. But even if the safe harbour does 
not apply, market shares, as such, do not render restrictive clauses illegal. In each case, an 
individual assessment has to be made. The central insight in this context is: Competition law 
does not content itself with a static analysis, but takes into account the dynamics of markets. 
There is space for the justification of restrictive agreements as long as the necessity of the 
restriction for the process of innovation is shown. However, the innovation argument must not 
serve as a mere pretext hiding the anticompetitive goal of certain restrictions. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the globalised world, competitiveness and innovation play a crucial role in economic 
growth.85 The emergence and development of the new economy is driven by innovation, and 
innovation often takes the form of IP.86 Therefore, cases involving the interface of IP and 
competition law are arising more and more frequently. At the same time, technological 
complexity has increased the need for interaction among competitors, which raises competition 
law issues.87 The importance of dynamic competition, rather than static competition, has to be 
emphasised, and this on a global basis.88 Against this backdrop, a number of competition law 
regimes have provided guidance through the issuance of IP guidelines. Indeed, proper guidance 
                                                 
84 All this is explained in more depth in the European TT-Guidelines, N. 79 et seq. 
85 Bohannan and Hovenkamp 2012, p. 1; Carrier 2009, p. 1. 
86 Gavil et al. 2008, p. 1153. 
87 See e.g., Sullivan and Grimes 2006, p. 841. 
88 Teece 2011, p. 208. 
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is essential, especially when competition law evolves through statutory provisions rather than 
case law. 
   While there is some divergence in monopoly cases among competition regimes,89 we can 
observe a considerable convergence in the IP licensing framework. Some general principles 
seem to be widely accepted today, including the following: (i) for the purpose of competition 
law, IP is comparable to other forms of property; (ii) IPRs in themselves do not automatically 
create market power; and (iii) IP licensing is generally favourable to competition.90 In addition, 
this general framework is implemented by specific rules based on the distinction of product, 
technology, and innovation markets, the difference between horizontal and vertical agreements, 
market share thresholds, exceptions for hardcore restrictions, as well as other safe harbours and 
presumptions (e.g., the 4-plus-test). 
   There are inevitable trade-offs between IP and competition law,91 but there is no genuine 
contradiction between these two fields of law. It may be true that ‘perfect competition is 
incompatible with IP’,92 but this adage is restricted to the world of static equilibrium theory. In 
the “real world”, the positive and negative aspects of exclusivity have to be explored with the 
aim of providing the optimal incentives to innovate.93 IP guidelines have to strike the balance 
between the under-enforcement and over-enforcement of competition law. On the one hand, IP 
guidelines provide a green light to agreements which are favourable for competition and 
innovation; on the other hand, they provide yellow and red lights to undertakings that are 
reaching the level of anti-competitive concern. 
   Today, competition regimes around the world admit the benefits of various types of 
efficiency-enhancing co-operation between undertakings and specify such business practices 
in their guidelines.94 Regularly, undertakings are under a duty of self-assessment. In particular, 
multinational enterprises have improved their efforts to comply with competition laws in the 
major competition jurisdictions.95 The adoption of guidelines has facilitated this endeavour.96 
                                                 
89 See e.g., Czapracka 2009, p. 1 et seq. 
90 Sec. 2.0 of the US Guidelines; Carrier 2009, p. 81. 
91 Carrier 2009, p. 3. 
92 See e.g., Sidak and Teece 2011, p. 57. 
93 See e.g., Bohannan and Hovenkamp 2012, p. 9. The choice and balance of monopoly and competition is crucial 
for competition policymakers; IP guidelines determine the level of market power, and respectively, exclusivity, 
which maximises the incentives to innovate. 
94 See e.g., Kuik 2007, p. 143. 
95 See e.g., Jerez 2015, p. 352 et seq. 
96 See e.g., Ginsburg and Fraser 2011, p. 42. 
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   Recent developments at the intersection of competition law and IP have accelerated the 
convergence between competition law systems, not only between jurisdictions with a long 
competition law tradition, but also with respect to developing competition regimes, such as that 
in Korea. Although differences remain, the process of convergence will continue. This not only 
affects substantive rules, but also legal techniques, such as, for example, the establishment of 
safe harbours. The efforts to adopt guidelines around the world are improving the coherence of 
competition policy on the global level and facilitating an understanding of the complementary 
character of competition law and IP protection. The pace of innovation and the worldwide 
transfer of technology will benefit considerably from this development. 
 
References 
 
Abbott AF (2014) The evolving IP–antitrust interface in the USA – the recent gradual 
weakening of patent rights. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2: 363-388 
Aghion P et al. (2005) Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120: 701-728 
American Bar Association (2007) Intellectual property and antitrust handbook. ABA 
Publishing, Chicago 
Anderman S (2006) EC Competition law and intellectual property rights: The regulation of 
innovation. Oxford University Press, New York 
Anderman S (2008) The new EC competition law framework for technology transfer and IP 
licensing. In: Drexl J (ed), Research handbook on intellectual property and competition 
law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton  
Anderman S (2012) Innovation, IPRs and EU competition law: Cross currents in the EU/US 
debate. In: Ezrachi A (ed), Research handbook on international competition law. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
Anderman S, Schmidt H (2011) EU competition law and intellectual property rights: The 
regulation of innovation, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New York 
Armillotta M (2010) Technology pooling licensing agreements: Promoting patent access 
through collaborative IP mechanisms. Nomos, Baden-Baden 
Bohannan C, Hovenkamp H (2012) Creation without restraint: Promoting liberty and rivalry 
in innovation. Oxford University Press, New York 
18 
 
Bowman W (1973) Patent and antitrust law - a legal and economic appraisal. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 
Caggiano G (2012) Competition and regulation of intellectual property rights for the 
achievement and functioning of the internal market. In: Caggiano G et al. (eds), 
Competition law and intellectual property: A European perspective. Wolters Kluwer, 
Alphen aan den Rijn 
Carrier MA (2009) Innovation for the 21st century. Oxford University Press, New York 
Cass RA, Hylton KN (2013) Laws of creation: Property rights in the world of ideas. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA 
Cheng TK (2012) The patent – competition interface in Asia: A regional approach? In: Ezrachi 
A (ed), Research handbook on international competition law. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, Northampton 
Choi YS (2011) A study of competition law and intellectual property in the EU: Comparative 
perspectives in licensing agreements. Journal of Intellectual Property 6: 109-145 
Coates et al. (2014) Intellectual property. In: Faull J, Nikpay A (eds), The EU law of 
competition, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, New York 
Cornish W et al. (2010) Intellectual property: Patents, copyright, trade marks and allied rights, 
7th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London 
Cotter TF (2015) Innovation and antitrust policy. In: Blair RD, Sokol DD (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of international antitrust economics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press, 
New York 
Crane DA (2015) Rationales for antitrust: Economics and other bases. In: Blair RD, Sokol DD 
(eds), The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, Volume 1. Oxford 
University Press, New York 
Czapracka K (2009) Intellectual property and the limits of antitrust: A comparative study of 
US and EU approaches. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
Drexl J (2008) Is there a ‘more economic approach’ to intellectual property and competition 
law? In: Drexl J (ed), Research handbook on intellectual property and competition law. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
Evans DS, Schmalensee R (2015) The antitrust analysis of multisided platform businesses. In: 
Blair RD, Sokol DD (eds), The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, 
Volume 1. Oxford University Press, New York 
Fine FL (2006) The EC competition law on technology licensing. Sweet & Maxwell, London 
19 
 
Gavil AI et al. (2008) Antitrust law in perspective: Cases, concepts and problems in competition 
policy, 2nd edn. Thomson/West, St Paul  
Gebicka A, Heinemann A (2014) Social media & competition law. World Competition 37: 149-
172 
Gerber DJ (2010) Global competition. Oxford University Press, New York 
Geroski PA (1999) Innovation as an engine of competition. In: Mueller DC, Haid A, Weigand 
J (eds), Competition, efficiency, and welfare. Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague 
Gilbert RJ (2008) Competition policy for intellectual property. In: Buccirossi P (ed), Handbook 
of antitrust economics. MIT Press, Cambridge MA 
Gilbert RJ, Weinschel AJ (2008) Competition policy for intellectual property: Balancing 
competition and reward. In: ABA section of antitrust law, issues in competition law and 
policy. ABA Publishing, Chicago 
Ginsburg DH, Fraser EM (2011) The role of economic analysis in competition law. In: McEwin 
RI (ed), Intellectual property, competition law, and economics in Asia. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, Portland 
Glader M (2006) Innovation markets and competition analysis: EU competition law and US 
antitrust law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton  
Gotts IK (2013) Market definition in the merger context: Hard work pays off in the long-run. 
In: Hawk B (ed), 2012 Fordham Competition Law Institute: International antitrust law 
and policy. Juris Publishing, New York 
Goyder J, Albors-Llorens A (2009) Goyder’s EC competition law, 5th edn. Oxford University 
Press, New York 
Greaves R (1994) EC block exemption regulations. Chancery Law Publishing, London 
Heinemann A (2008) The contestability of IP-protected markets. In Drexl J (ed), Research 
handbook on intellectual property and competition law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
Northampton 
Heinemann A (2011a) Intellectual property rights and market integration. In: Anderman S, 
Ezrachi A (eds), Intellectual property and competition law: New frontiers. Oxford 
University Press, New York  
Heinemann A (2011b) The impact of innovation – comments on Uwe Cantner and Wolfgang 
Kerber. In: Drexl J et al. (eds), Competition policy and the economic approach: 
Foundations and limitations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
20 
 
Heinemann A (2012) Intellectual property rights and merger control: How to secure incentives 
to innovate in the long run. In: Caggiano G et al. (eds), Competition law and intellectual 
property: A European perspective. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn 
Hovenkamp H (2005) United States antitrust policy in an age of IP expansion. In: Hawk B (ed), 
2004 Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International antitrust law and policy. Juris 
Publishing, New York 
Hovenkamp H (2011) Federal antitrust policy: The law of competition and its practices, 2nd 
edn. Thomson/West, St Paul 
Jerez HV (2015) Competition law enforcement and compliance across the world: A 
comparative review. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn 
Jones A, Sufrin, B (2014) EU competition law: Text, cases, and materials, 5th edn. Oxford 
University Press, New York 
Jorde TM, Teece DT (1992) Innovation, cooperation, and antitrust. In: Jorde TM, Teece DT 
(eds), Antitrust, innovation, and competitiveness. Oxford University Press, New York 
Kaplow L (2015) Market definition. In: Blair RD, Sokol DD (eds), The Oxford handbook of 
international antitrust economics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press, New York  
Korah V (1996) Technology transfer agreements and the EC competition rules. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford  
Kuik K (2007) Treatment of horizontal agreements: The quest for legal certainty – The EC 
competition law approach to horizontal co-operation agreements. In: Amato G, 
Ehlermann CD (eds), EC competition law: A critical assessment. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, Portland 
Landes WM, Posner RA (2003) The economic structure of intellectual property law. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA  
Leslie CR (2011) Antitrust law and intellectual property rights: Cases and materials. Oxford 
University Press, New York  
Lowe P, Peeperkorn L (2005) Singing in tune with competition and innovation: The new EU 
competition policy towards licensing. In: Hawk B (ed), 2004 Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute: International antitrust law and policy. Juris Publishing, New York  
Mendelsohn M, Rose S (2001) Guide to the EC block exemption for vertical agreements. 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
Myers G (2007) The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property: Cases and materials. 
Thomson/West, St Paul 
21 
 
Nevo H (2015) Definition of the relevant market: (Lack of) harmony between industrial 
economics and competition law. Intersentia, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland  
Niels G et al. (2011) Economics for competition lawyers. Oxford University Press, New York 
Pleatsikas C, Teece D (2001) New indicia for antitrust analysis in markets experiencing rapid 
innovation. In: Ellig J (ed), Dynamic competition and public policy: Technology, 
innovation, and antitrust issues. Cambridge University Press, New York 
Posner RA (2001) Antitrust in the new economy. Antitrust Law Journal 68: 925-943 
Ritter L, Braun WD (2004) European competition law: A practitioner’s guide, 3rd edn. Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 
Rose V, Bailey D (2013) Bellamy & Child European Union law of competition, 7th edn. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Sidak JG, Teece D (2011) Favouring dynamic competition over static competition in antitrust 
law. In: McEwin RI (ed), Intellectual property, competition law, and economics in Asia. 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland 
Sprigman CJ (2012) The intersection of patent and antitrust law. In: Elhauge E (ed), Research 
handbook on the economics of antitrust law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
Sullivan LA, Grimes WS (2006) The law of antitrust: An integrated handbook, 2nd edn. 
Thomson/West, St Paul 
Teece DJ (2011) Favoring dynamic over static competition: Implications for antitrust analysis 
and policy. In: Manne GA, Wright JD (eds), Competition policy and patent law under 
uncertainty: Regulating innovation. Cambridge University Press, New York  
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2007) Antitrust enforcement and 
intellectual property rights: Promoting innovation and competition. 
www.ftc.gov/reports/antitrust-enforcement-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-
innovation-competition-report. Accessed 27 June 2015  
Whish R, Bailey D (2012) Competition law, 7th edn. Oxford University Press, New York 
Wilson BB (1970) Patent and know-how license agreements: Field of use, territorial, price and 
quantity restrictions, address before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference (6 
November) 
 
